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Information Acquisition Decisions and the Choice of Financial Year-Ends
Abstract
In some industries the financial-year-ends of member firms are clustered together whereas in others they
are more widely dispersed.  This study attempts to provide an explanation for this phenomenon.  Recognizing that
financial-year-ends are not just the time when firms disclose information but also the time when they acquire
information (when books are closed), we frame this study in the larger economic context of determining the
optimal timing of information acquisition and release.  Prior studies have examined the fr quency with w ich
firms acquire costly information.  We address a question that follows naturally: given that information is acquired
only once every t operating periods, when during the t period should such an exercise take place?  We also examine
a related question: do competing firms have any incentive to share the information acquisition burden?
The results of our analysis indicate that firms’ choice of their financial year-end may partially be driven
by the degree of correlation between the firms’ cost (and demand) parameters and the incentives to share the
information acquisition burden.  Duopolists that face random but permanent shocks to their linear cost (or demand)
parameter every period, but who can collect information in only some of the periods, will choose identical year-
ends (that which is dictated by the stochastic environment) unless their costs are very strongly correlated (almost
close to 1).  Only when their costs are highly correlated do the firms choose staggered year-ends.  Whether year-
ends are clustered or staggered are also shown to be a function of the differences in cost variances for the two
firms.
3Information Acquisition Decisions and the Choice of Financial Year-Ends
1.  Introduction
Firms that operate in a changing environment must update their information periodically.
Since information collection is costly, such updating may not be feasible in every period or prior
to every operating decision.  With this in mind, prior studies have examined the fr quency with
which firms acquire costly information.  In this study we examine a question that follows
naturally: given that information will be acquired a predetermined number of times (e.g. once)
every t operating periods, when during the t periods should such an exercise(s) take place?  In
addition, if the acquired information is to be publicly disclosed such that it becomes available to
competitors, how will competing firms choose the acquisition and disclosure timing?
The answers to these questions are relevant to an understanding of firms’ choice of
financial year-ends.  Typically, a firm’s financial year-end (or the end of its quarterly interim
period) is the time when it (a) collects and collates information (when accounting books are
closed) and (b) publicly releases its financial report.  The timing choice examined here, wherein
the timing of information acquisition and release are coincident, is consistent with the decision
faced by firms in choosing their financial year-ends.  To date little research exists on this issue.
An examination of the financial year-ends for firms included in the 1996 Compustat tapes
indicates that although in many industries the year-ends are concentrated at 12/31, the degree of
concentration varies widely between industries.1  One possible reason for this dispersion or
uniformity in timing could well be a consideration by firms of the competitive impact of the timing
of their reports.2
                                              
1 For example, in industries such as computer communications equipment, semiconductors, software, computer
integrated systems (SIC codes 3571, 3674, 7372, and 7373, respectively) only about half the firms choose 12/31 as
their year-end, the rest are distributed over other months.  In industries such as petroleum refining and oil and gas
extraction and in regulated industries such as insurance, banks (SIC codes 2911, 1311, 6311, 6021) there appears
to be far more uniformity.
2   The choice of financial year-ends is governed by factors other than competitive concerns as well.  The
seasonality in some businesses may determine this choice.  For instance, in the retail industry most financial year-
4This paper investigates the impact of both stochastic and competitive environments on
firms’ information acquisition and disclosure decisions.  To isolate the impact of the stochastic
environment, we first examine a monopolist’s optimal timing when his linear cost (or demand)
parameter is subject to random but permanent shocks in each of t operating periods.  The
monopolist can acquire information only a few times (<t) during the t periods.  The results from
this analysis serve as a setting for our next scenario where we introduce a competitor with
correlated costs.  Since both firms operate in the same stochastic environment, in the absence of
competitive concerns both firms will acquire information at the same exact time, this timing being
identical to the one chosen by the monopolist in the preceding analysis.  However, the presence of
a competitor (who gets to observe their disclosed report) may cause the firms to deviate from this
“stochastically-optimum” timing and alter their information acquisition and disclosure patterns.
If publicly release financial reports of competitors are informative to other firms, these
reports can serve as an alternate means of information acquisition and may offer the non-
disclosing firms additional opportunities to update their information.  If firms stagger the release
date of their reports, they can update their information (based on the other firm’s report) part-way
through their own financial year.  Thus, in an duopoly each firm can update its information twice
during the year.  On the other hand, if they release their reports simultaneously, each firm updates
its information only once.
Our results indicate that, given the stochastic environment described here, the monopolist
spreads his information acquisition activities evenly over time.  More interestingly, we find that
the first information gathering exercise takes place not at th  beginning of the first operating
period, but only after initially going a number of periods without any new information.  The
intuition for this result is as follows.   If the monopolist investigates costs early, as time passes this
early-acquired data becomes less and less informative about later periods.  On the other hand, by
delaying the investigation the value of the information eventually gathered may be greater, but
that superior information can only be exploited for the few remaining periods.  As a result of these
                                                                                                                                               
ends are in January or February, when inventory levels are at post-Christmas lows.  As another example, firms in
most regulated industries do not have discretion in choosing their financial year-ends.
5tradeoffs between early versus late gathering of information, the monopolist acquires information
only after a few initial periods but before the final period.
For the duopolists, we find that unless the costs of the two firms are very strongly
correlated (almost close to 1), firms will choose to acquire and disclose at the same time.  Only
when the costs are almost perfectly correlated do the firms choose staggered acquisition and
disclosure.  This suggests that we are more likely to see staggered financial year-ends in industries
with very similar firms, i.e., similar with respect to technology and cost structures.  The results
also suggest that competitive concerns, whether in terms of learning from rivals’ reports or
preventing rivals from learning from one’s own report, play a role secondary to that of the
stochastic environment in determining the choice of financial year-ends.3
Our results may also be relevant to empirical research that uses financial year-ends as a
sample selection criteria.  Using such criteria introduces a selection bias the nature of which this
study attempts to explain.  For instance, studies on intra ndustry information transfers (e.g., Foster
(1981) and Frost (1995)) hypothesize that the strength of such transfers is positively correlated
with within-industry homogeneity.  Our results suggest that the greater the within-industry
homogeneity, more likely it is for firms to choose dispersed financial year-ends.  Therefore, by
restricting attention to firms that have the same financial year-end  (December 31) these studies
may be including relatively dissimilar firms, thereby downward biasing their results.
Finally, numerous prior studies have looked at trade associations as a mechanism for firms
to share information with their industry comembers.  Similar to the present study, these
information sharing studies are also about simultaneous acquisition and release of information -
firms acquire more precise information in return for revealing their private signals to the trade
association.  However, trade associations, by law, are required to release only aggregated (and
                                              
3   The stochastic environment in our model is such that firms face a random but permanent shock to their costs
every period.  To make the stochastic environment “less severe”, an alternative approach would be to allow that the
shocks are only semi-permanent  (i.e., allow a Markovian rather than a strictly random walk structure on costs).
However, this modification makes the model exceedingly complicated and does not allow for closed-form
analytical solutions.
6not firm-specific) data to the members.  Therefore, timing issues of the kind examined here, where
each firm has the option of revealing separately, cannot be examined in the trade association
setting.  In this study we examine (what amounts to) a novel mechanism for competing firms to
collaborate in sharing information; firms “share” information by agreeing to release their reports at
different times.  Despite the apparent similarities in the two settings, however, we find that the
degree of collaboration typically found in information sharing studies does not carry over (but
rather is inversely related) to information acquisition decisions of the kind examined here.  The
intuition for this divergence in results is explained later.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  The next section provides a brief review
of the literature on information acquisition in general and information sharing in competitive
environments. Section 3 describes the model.  Section 4 analyzes the timing decision of the
monopolist whereas Section 5 is devoted to the duopolists’ acquisition and disclosure decisions.
Section 6 provides a summary and conclusions.
2.  Background Literature
2.1  Information Acquisition
Few studies have analyzed the information acquisition choices of firms.  In an infinite
horizon model, Hughes [1975, 1977] investigates the optimal timing for obtaining (costly) reports
about an underlying Markovian process.  The firm weighs the costs of not investigating a
potentially out of control process which leads to higher operating costs, against the costs of
investigating the process and rectifying it if it is found to be out of control.  Similar to our study,
when reports yield perfect information, Hughes [1975] shows that the optimal policy calls for
equally-spaced investigative reports.  When reports are imperfectly informative, Hughes [1977]
shows that there are benefits to acquiring cost information from other than the most recent period.
In contrast to our study, though, he does not investigate the impact of competition in such
choices, and his modeling of the stochastic environment (a stationary state M rkovian process) is
different from ours.
7Hansen and Sankar [1998] look for the length of the data acquisition cycle n industries
where costs follow a first order auto egressive process.  Our focus, in contrast, is on the timing
within a particular data acquisition cycle.  Li, McKelvy, and Page [1986] examine optimal
research by oligopolists in a one-period two-stage game in which each firm first invests in costly
research, and then with the information so gathered, competes in the product market.  The focus
is on the optimal amount of research that the oligopolists individually undertake, where the
greater the research, the higher the precision of the signal concerning the uncertain parameter.
Similarly, in the context of a stochastic Cournot oligopoly with convex costs, Kirby [1993] also
investigates the optimal amount of information to acquire, where the choice is in terms of the
number of noisy (and costly) signals to acquire.  In contrast, we look for the best timing for
research in a multi-period setting in which we assume that research yields perfect information for
the investigating firms.
2.2  Information Sharing by Duopolists
Numerous prior studies have documented the incentives of firms to precom it mutual
sharing of information with their industry comembers through mechanisms such as trade
associations.4  In this study we examine what amounts to an alternative mechanism for sharing
information; in our setup firms share information by releasing their financial reports at different
times.  As such, it is instructive to review the relevant literature on information sharing in
oligopolies.  Prior research has established that in a homogenous good Cournot oligopoly with
linear demand and constant unit costs, and with truthful information sharing, the degree of
information sharing through mechanisms such as trade associations is dependent on
· the precision of the signals received and
· the correlation between the  firms’ stochastic parameters. The greater the correlation the less
incentive there is for firms to share information.5
                                              
4   See, for instance, Novshek and Sonnenschein [1982], Fried [1984], Vives [1986], Jin [1992], Raith [1993].
5  Besides the degree of correlation between the firms' stochastic parameters, other factors that affect the
information sharing incentives are:  degree of product differentiation, substitutes versus complements, Cournot
8When each firm receives perfect signals on its own costs, sharing information with a rival does not
improve the firm’s information about its own costs, but leads only to improved information
regarding the rivals’ reactions.  Fried [1984], Sakai [1986] and Shapiro [1986] examined such a
setting when the uncertain parameters were imperfectly correlated across firms (0 < r < 1), and
found that sharing of such information is mutually beneficial.  Fried [1984] also found that when
only one duopolist gathers information, it still might be beneficial for that duopolist o
(unilaterally) disclose the information to his rival.  Those benefits, however, are dependent on r.
As r approaches 1, it may be harmful to disclose unilaterally.
The model we examine is a multiperiod extension of models similar to Fried [1984], Sakai
[1986] and Shapiro [1986] in that firms receive perfect signals on their costs.  Whereas in the
information sharing literature a firm may choose not to share information to minimize competitive
costs, in our setting nondisclosure is not an option.  Firms must reveal their information, their only
choice is about the timing.
3.  The Model
Consider a product market with a linear demand curve and constant marginal costs, such
that the inverse demand curve in period t is given by:
Price(t) = A - dQ(t) (1)
where Q is the aggregate output of all firms, and d is a known constant (set equal to 1 without
loss of generality).
Let Ci (t) =  c  +  wi (t) be the unit marginal cost of firm i for period t, where c is the
deterministic component (set equal to 0 without loss of generality) and wi(t) is the stochastic
component.  In each period k, firm i’s costs receive a random but permanent shock ui(k), such
that costs in period t are a sum of all random shocks received in prior periods.  Therefore,
                                                                                                                                               
versus Bertrand competition, convexity of costs, the precision and correlation of the signals etc. Raith [1993]
provides a good summary of the relevant literature.
9wi(t) º ui(k)
k=1
t
å
Alternatively stated, we assume that unit costs follow a random walk process.  This formulation
has the realistic property that as time passes, older information becomes less informative
regarding future cost conditions.  ui(k) is i.i.d. Normal, with mean 0 and variance vi
2 for all k.
Thus, Variance(wi k)) = kvi2 .
In periods prior to the first information collection exercise, the expected unit costs
E(w(t))are equal to 0, the prior mean.  It is assumed that information collection by firm i at he
beginning of period j (prior to making its production choice in that period) yields perfect
knowledge of wi(j).6  From period j onwardsE(w(t))=w( j) , till information is updated again.
Given the information available at the beginning of any period, each firm maximizes expected
profits.  Profits for firm  in period t are given by:
Pi (t) = (A- Ci (t)- Q(t))qi(t)= (A- wi(t)- Q(t))qi(t) (2)
The time horizon is made up of T operating periods, where production decisions are made
at the beginning of each period t, but information is gathered and released in only some of the
periods.  The decision regarding when to collect information (that is, at the beginning of which
period(s)) is made before the start of the first period, at time t0.  The sequence of events is as
follows:
Production Production          Production Production
decision decision          decision decision
for period 1 for period 2          for period 3 for period T
    t=1   t=2     t=T
                                              
6   Note that we do not include in this model a cost for acquiring information.  This cost will be of importance in
determining how often to collect information, but once this frequency is determined, such costs are not likely to
influence the timing of information collection.
10
t=t0 t=t1
Firms decide Information
the timing for collected/disclosed for
collecting/disclosing information the first time
Figure 1.  Time line (with first information collection at beginning of period 3)
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This sequence of events described above is consistent with a setting where a financial year
(or quarter) is made up of several operating periods, and in which information is collected once
during the financial year (or quarter), and not prior to every operating period.
3.1  Tradeoffs in the Timing of Information Acquisition
For problems of this nature, the optimal production decision is of the form
qi
*(t) =
A- E(wi(t)) - (Q(t)- qi
* (t))
2
 (3)
and expected profits are E(qi*(t))2 .  Since expected profit is convex in the quantity produced,
expected profit will increase as the variability of output increases.  If no information is collected,
expected Variance(qi
* )=0.  If information is collected in period t, expected Variance(qi
* ) is an
increasing function of Variance(E(wi (t )) , which, in turn, is an increasing function of t .  This is the
source of the tradeoffs in our model.  When a firm delays gathering information in any period,
profits are “lost” in that period.  The tradeoff, however, is that by delaying the acquisition of
information, the value of the information eventually gathered is greater as Variance(E(wi (t ))
increases as t increases.  However, that superior information can only be exploited for the
remaining periods.
4.  Information Acquisition by a Monopolist
Consider the case of a monopolist facing random but permanent shocks to his costs7 in
every one of T periods.  He makes production decisions in each of these periods, but can acquire
information only n times over the T periods (n £  T).  His profits in any period t are given by
P(t) = (A- w(t)- q(t))q(t).  From (3), his production decision will be
                                              
7    In keeping with the framework until now, our discussion will be in terms of the monopolist’s cost parameter.
However, given that costs as well as demand are linear, the results would be identical if we assumed that the
demand intercept A faced random shocks.
12
q*(t) =
A- E(w(t))
2
Prior to collecting information, E(w(t))= 0, the prior mean.  Let ti r present the period in
which the monopolist gathers information for the ith time.  Information acquisition at the
beginning of period ti reveals w(ti) perfectly and E(w(ti)) =w(ti) .  Also, from period ti
onwardsE(w(t))=w(ti ), till information is updated again in period ti+1.
It is straightforward to show that his expected profits for any given period t are equal to
P*(t) = E[q*(t)]2 = E[
A - E(w(ti))
2
]2 =  [
A2 + Variance(E(w(t)))
4
 ] where (4)
Variance(E(w(t))) = 0 for  t < t1 and  (5.1)
          = tiv2             for ti £  t <  ti+1
(5.2)
with the inner expectations in (4) taken at the beginning of period t, and the outer ones at time t0..
Equalities (5.1) and (5.2) follow from the fact that w(t) º u(k)
k=1
t
å , E(u(t)) = 0, and that u(k) are
serially uncorrelated.  Total expected profit over all the T periods (where the expectation is taken
at the beginning of period 1 at time t0) is given by :
P* =
TA2
4
+  (ti -  ti-1)
ti-1v
2
4i=1
n
å  +  (T +1-  tn)tnv
2
4
(6)
The monopolist will maximize expected profit by acquiring information as per the
following proposition.
Proposition 1:  For a monopolist gathering cost or demand information n times in T subperiods
(n £ T), new information will be gathered at the beginning of every (T+1)/(n+1)th period.
Proof:  See Appendix A1.
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According to the Proposition, the monopolist will gather information evenly over time, at
equally spaced intervals.8  The results also show that (T+1)/(n+1) periods will pass before the first
information gathering exercise.  For instance,
· if n = 1 (information is acquired only once over the T periods), information will be gathered at
the half way point; i.e.,
  t1 = 
( )T +1
2
· if n = 2 (information is collected twice), then information is gathered at the “one-third” and
“two-thirds” points; i.e.,
t1 = 
(T +1)
3
 and t2 = 
2(T +1)
3
 .
The firm is therefore willing to remain uninformed for some initial periods in order to get
better information later.  The intuition for this result follows from our discussion earlier.  Delaying
information means foregone expected profits; however, the information eventually gathered is
worth more. This pattern of evenly-spaced information collection follows directly from the
random walk characteristics of costs.9 We make use of these results later in our discussion of the
duopolists’ problem.
5.  Information Acquisition by Duopolists
To examine the impact of competition on the timing of the information acquisition
exercises, we now consider a homogenous good market with two firms whose costs are
correlated.  Each firm’s costs behave as the costs of the monopolist described in section 3, with
the additional assumptions as to the cross-sectional correlation:
                                              
8   Depending on the value of T, the ratio (T+1)/(n+1) need not be an integer.  In that case the length of time
between two adjacent acquisition exercises is identical, except that the interval following the last point of
acquisition may be shorter.
9  Costs that have different autoregressive properties will yield a different time-pattern.
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(a).  Covariance(u i (k), u j(k)) =  rviv j where r is the coefficient of correlation.
and (b).  Covariance(u i (k), u j (l)) =  0  
Assumption (a) means that in any given period k the shocks to firm i and firm j’s costs are
correlated, with r as the coefficient of correlation.  Assumption (b) states that the random shocks
are serially uncorrelated.  Since wi(t) º ui(k)
k=1
t
å , these assumptions together imply that the
covariance of the two firms’ costs in any period k = Covariance(wi(k), wj(k)) = k r vivj.
As long as a firm’s costs are not revealed to its rival, each firm will collect information
exactly as the monopolist in the prior section.  However, allowing for the possibility of
information revelation to the rival changes the incentives significantly.  Since the firms’ costs are
correlated, knowledge of the rival’s costs is informative about one’s own costs as well.  Thus,
instead of each firm individually undertaking the expense of investigating its costs every period,
firms may benefit by coordinating their information acquisition/disclosure exercises.  For instance,
this can be done by staggering their financial year-ends, such that a firm can learn from the
publicly disclosed financial reports of other firms, and get an updated signal on its costs before its
own year-end when it collects its cost information.  The benefits of such an arrangement would be
the increased frequency with which firms get information on their cost estimates.  Each firm
would get two signals (as against only one) about its costs - one a perfect one (from its own
investigative activities), the other a noisy one (from the rival’s cost information).  In such an
arrangement we look for the timing of the information gathering exercises that the two firms will
commit to ex ante.
We further assume that since investigating costs is an expensive exercise, each duopolist
investigates his costs only once every T periods.  Such an investigation yields perfect information
regarding the investigating firm’s costs in all prior periods as well as the current period. The
sequence of events is as follows (see Figure 1 for time line).  The duopolists noncooperatively
make production choices at the beginning of each of T periods.  In addition, at the start of period
1 the duopolists decide when each duopolist will collect information regarding his costs.  This is
reflective of the choice of financial year-ends by firms whose financial years are made up of
15
several operating cycles.  Once chosen, firms are committed to their financial year-ends.  This
prevents the information sharing arrangement from unraveling ex-post, since financial reports
must be released at the chosen financial year-end.
5.2  Analysis and Results
We assume that if it is agreed that information is to be collected by the two firms at
different points in time, duopolist f will be the first one to acquire the information and that
information will be gathered at time t1.10  The second uopolist, duopolist s, will gather
information at t2 ( 2  t 1).  Firm f (s) chooses t1 (t2) to maximize the sum of the expected profits
from all the T operating periods.  Then expected profits over T periods (expectation taken at the
beginning of period 1, at time t=t0) are given by (see Appendix A2 for derivation):
Pf* = T(
A2
9
) + [F1](t2-t1) + [F2](T+1-t2) (7.1)
Ps* = T(
A2
9
) + [S1](t2- 1) + [S2](T+1-t2) (7.2)
where
· A
2
9
 is the profit that would have accrued in the absence of any information gathering.
· F1 (S1) represents the increase (over 
A2
9
) in f’s (s’s) expected profits resulting from the
information acquired in period t1 by uopolist f.  Since that term is positive for both duopolists
both benefit from the information acquisition (and sharing) done by duopolist f.  That benefit
is fixed until period t2.
· F2 (S2) represents the increase (over A
2
9
) in firm f’s (s’s) expected profits resulting from the
information acquired in period t2 by duopolist s.  That term is also positive and the benefit
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from information acquisition and sharing stays at their respective levels for each duopolist for
the remaining (T+1-t2) periods.
· F1 = (b f - 2)
2 t1v f
2
9
· F2 = (1- 2Hb s)
2t2vs
2
9
+
4G2t1vf
2
9
+
4(2Hbs -1)Gt1rvf vs
9
· S1 = (1- 2bf )
2t1v f
2
9
· S2 = (Hbs - 2)
2 t 2vs
2
9
+
G2t1vf
2
9
+
2(Hb s - 2)Gt1rv fvs
9
· vf2 and vs2 are the variances of the random shock terms
· bf = rvs/vf and bs=rvf/vs
· G = t 2 (1 - r
2 )
t2 - t1r
2
æ 
è 
ç 
ö 
ø 
÷  and H =
t 2 - t1
t 2 - t1r
2
æ 
è 
ç 
ö 
ø 
÷ 
Note that even though the acquired information is disclosed to the rival, the net payoff is
positive for all values of the parameter for both duopolists;  that is, the benefits of improved
information outweigh the loss from disclosing this information to the rival.  Equations (7.1) and
(7.2) do not lend themselves to tractable closed form solutions in all cases.  However, results can
be found for the two boundary cases r=0 and r=1.  The results of these cases  make for interesting
comparisons with the information sharing results and the monopoly results of section 4.
Proposition 2:  When r=0, both duopolists acquire information at the same time and t1 = t2 =
(T + 1)
2
.
Proof:   See Appendix A3.
                                                                                                                                               
10   This is not an innocuous assumption, since there may be (as we shall see) benefits to being the first or second
acquirer.  However, we can motivate this by thinking of f as an existing firm which has already chosen its financial
year-end, and s as a later entrant in the industry.
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Proposition 3:  When r=1, information acquisition is spread evenly over the T periods and t1 =
(T + 1)
3
 and t2 = 
2(T + 1)
3
.
Proof: :  See Appendix A3.
Proposition 2 shows that when the duopolists’ costs are completely independent, there is
no incentive for collaborating on the timing of research.  Each firm collects information as the
monopolist in the previous section, at the half-way point.  At the other extreme, Proposition 3
shows that when the duopolists costs are perfectly correlated, the two firms take turns in
acquiring information and spread out their information gathering exercises at equally-spaced
intervals.
5.3  Numerical Analysis
Before proceeding to a discussion of the results, we need to address what happens
between the extreme cases of r=0 and r=1.  Since we could not get a closed form solution which
maximizes equations (7.1) and (7.2), we used numerical analysis varying r between 0 and 1 by 0.1
and varying the relative proportion of v1 to v2 rom 1:1 to 1:25.
When the variances were equal (v1/v2=1), the duopolists staggered their information
acquisition only when r reached 0.995.  For values of r lower than 0.995 simultaneous acquisition
at (T + 1)
2
 was always a solution, and for relatively higher values of r in this range multiple
equilibria were possible.  When there was more than one equilibrium, the highest payoff for both
players occurred at the equilibrium t1 = t2 =
(T + 1)
2
.
Table 1 illustrates these results for T=11, r=0.3 and r=0.9 when the variances are equal.
The rows (columns) indicate the period duop list 1(2) acquires information.  [Note the label of 1
or 2 is not related to who goes first or second.]  The payoff for duop list 1 (2) is the first
(second) in each cell.  Since the variances are equal, the matrices are symmetric.
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At r=0.3, the highest payoff (15.20) for both duop lists occurs when both acquire
information in the 6th period.  This is, of course, the midpoint solution (T+1)/2.  There are no
incentives for collaboration on information acquisition.  When r=0.9, there are three equilibrium
solutions (6,6), (7,7) and (8,8).  The highest payoffs of these equilibrium occurs at (6,6) and thus
the equilibrium solution would once again occur at (T+1)/2.  However, note that duopolis  1
would be best off at (7,4) whereas duopolist 2 would be best off at (4,7), although these are not
equilibrium solutions in the noncooperative game. (These points, of course, approach the solution
of (4,8) and (8,4) obtained when r=1.)  Each, however, would want the other to go first.  In the
absence of resolution of that issue, (6,6) defaults to the solution.
When the variances of the two firms are different (v1/v2 other than 1), as we varied r
between 0 and 1, we found that for low values of r the solution was usually at t1 = t2 = 
(T + 1)
2
.
For relatively higher values of r, such as for r = 0.5, 0.6, 0.7 with v1/v2 = 1/25, an equilibrium
solution was not always possible since the issue of who went “first” came into play.  Only when r
approached the vicinity of 0.8 or 0.9 were incentives for information collaboration apparent, and
information acquisition was staggered.
With this background, we can now turn to a discussion of the results.
5.4  Discussion of Results
The results indicate that when r = 1 the firms collaborate on information acquisition, and
stagger their financial year-ends.  When r=0, both collect and release information at the same time
(the half-way point). These results can be understood if we note that information in a competitive
environment is valuable because it provides knowledge as to
1. the duopolist’s own cost function; as well as
2. the rival’s (costs and resultant) actions
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Of these two pieces of information, knowledge of one’s own costs is relatively more
important in terms of impact on expected profits.  When r=0, observing the rival’s costs does not
provide any information regarding one’s own costs.  Each firm, therefore, chooses the timing of
its information acquisition like a monopolist that has a single chance of acquiring information
during the T periods, and thus both firms acquire information at the same point in time, (T+1)/2.
When r=1, firms then have two sources of information for the same stochastic variable.  Timing is
determined then “as if” firms have two chances to acquire information during the T periods, and
we have the monopolist solution for n=2.11
Numerical analysis indicates that simultaneous acquisition of information continues to be
an equilibrium outcome even as r approaches 1 (e.g. Table 1 for r=0.9), and staggered acquisition
is an outcome only at values of r very close to 1.  In other words, the impact of the stochastic
environment in determining the timing choice continues to dominate until the benefits of sharing
are very strong – at values of r close to 1.  We conjecture that if the stochastic shocks to costs
were less persistent, staggered disclosure may be the outcome for lower values of r as well.  The
stochastic environment in our model is such that firms face a random but pe manent shock to
their costs every period.  This creates a strong incentive to choose the mid-point as the optimum
time for updating information.  A generalization of the model would be to allow the shocks to be
only semi-permanent  (i.e., allow a Markovian rather than a strictly random walk structure on
costs).  However, this modification makes the model exceedingly complicated and does not allow
for closed-form analytical solutions.
The importance of the issue of who goes first or second also explains this “discontinuity”
in the results as r approaches 1.  Since knowledge of one’s own costs is relatively more important
                                              
11  These results can be understood on a more formal basis  by looking at the model in the Appendix.  Note that
when r=0 the payoff function of each firm is separable in t1 and t2 (Equations 8.1 and 8.2 in Appendix A3), so that
the marginal contribution of changes in t1 are dependent of the choice of t2 and vice versa.  As a result each firm
chooses its timing independently at the same point, (T+1)/2.  In contrast when r=1, the marginal contribution of
changes in timing varies with the timing selected by the rival t2 (Equat ons 9.1 and 9.2 in Appendix A3).  Cross
effects are positive in this case and hence simultaneous acquisition of information cannot be optimal.  We thank
the referee for pointing this out.
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and information acquired later has more value, each firm has strong incentive to delay that
acquisition and go second.  In the absence of the resolution of the issue of who goes first, (T+1)/2
defaults to the equilibrium solution even for relatively high values of r.  When variances are
unequal, the issue of who goes first is exacerbated, and we find that an equilibrium solution to the
noncooperative game is not always possible.
We find that the factors that typically influence the degree of collaboration in information
sharing studies (in which information is shared through a trade association) do not carry over to
information acquisition decisions examined here.  This is because in the present setting firms are
always assumed to reveal information, even when r=1.  As a result, the timing decision is
motivated mainly by each firm’s attempt to learn as much as possible about its own costs, and not
by strategic considerations that prevent firms from revealing information to rivals through trade
associations.12  We also find that, unlike in the information sharing literature, the basic nature of
our results do not change when we consider Bertrand instead of Cournot competition.13
5.4  Empirical Implications and Generalizations
In their study comparing the financial characteristics of December and non-December
year-end firms Smith and Pourciau (1988) found that although 62% of all firms have 12/31 as
their year-end, the pattern of concentration of year-ends varies widely across industries (Table 2,
page 342).  For instance , whereas more than 90% of the firms have 12/31 as their financial year-
end in industries such as metal mining, petroleum refining, air transport and banking, in other
industries such as building construction, retail-food, hotels, business services, and automotive
                                              
12 In the information sharing studies, with perfectly informative signals, information sharing leads only to
improved information on the rivals’ costs.  As a result oligopolists will ex ante always prefer to mutu lly hare
information, irrespective of the value of r.  They will be willing do reveal information unilaterally only at small r.
In contrast, in our setting firms’ acquisition/sharing decisions are motivated mainly by each firm’s attempt to learn
as much as possible about its own cost parameter. Firms learn the most from collaboration when their costs are
correlated.  In this setting, therefore, only when r is large and near 1 is there collaboration on information
acquisition.
13  The analysis for Bertrand competition is available from the authors upon request.
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services only about half of all firms have their year-ends at 12/31.  For these latter firms, this study
does not detail whether the year-ends of the remaining firms are clustered around another date, or
are dispersed throughout the remainder of the year.
Our results suggests that, for the stochastic environment described above, similar firms
(i.e., firms whose costs are relatively more correlated) are more likely to choose dispersed or
staggered year-ends.  Conversely, year-ends concentrated on a particular date are more likely to
be found in industries where firms differ in terms of their cost structure, production technologies
and/or product differentiation.  We find these results to be relatively robust to changes in market
power (i.e., increasing the number of firms) and also to changes in the nature of competition
(Bertrand versus Cournot).
Many empirical studies use financial year-ends as a sample selection criteria.  These results
suggest that imposing a year-end restriction (usually 12/31) for sample selection may bias the
sample and therefore the results.  For instance, studies on intraindustry information transfers (e.g.,
Foster (1981) and Frost (1995)) hypothesize that the strength of such transfers is positively
correlated with within-industry homogeneity.  Our results suggest that the greater the within-
industry homogeneity, more likely it is for firms to choose dispersed financial year-ends.
Therefore, by restricting attention to firms that have similar financial year-ends these studies may
be including relatively dissimilar firms, thereby downward biasing their results.
Finally, note that one way to interpret our research question is:  if firms had an incentive to
choose a particular year-end(such as 1/31 for retail firms), could the benefits from sharing the
information acquisition burden ever be sufficient to make them deviate from this chosen year-end?
In our setting, the stochastic environment made the midpoint of the time horizon the desired year-
end, but if the rivals’ financial report proved informative enough (i.e., costs were highly
correlated) a firm was willing to deviate from this desired optimum.  Thus our results can be
generalized to settings where a particular year-end (such as 1/31 for retail firms) would be
desired, except when there are significant opportunities to learn from the competitors’ publicly
disclosed financial reports.
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6.  Summary and Conclusions
In this paper we examined the optimal timing for acquiring information for a monopolist
and also for duopolists, each facing stochastic but permanent shocks to his linear cost (or
demand) parameter every period.  We find that the monopolist prefers to spread limited number of
information gathering opportunities evenly over several periods.  When the uopolists c oose
their information acquisition/disclosure timing ex ante, the resultant agreements are a function of
the degree of correlation between their costs.  Only when costs are very highly correlated do the
duopolists stagger the acquisition timing; otherwise, from very low (zero) to moderately high
degrees of correlation, simultaneous acquisition (and disclosure) is the preferred choice.
Our results contribute towards explaining the choice of financial year-ends by firms.
Compustat data for 1996 reveals that although the financial year-ends of firms are concentrated at
12/31, the degree of concentration varies widely between industries.  Our results indicate that
unless firms’ costs are very highly correlated, competitive concerns reinforce this tendency by
firms in the same industry to release information at the same time.  The incentive to choose
staggered financial year-ends occurs only when firms’ costs are very highly correlated, as is likely
to be the case for firms producing very similar products using similar technologies, such as
commodities.  Further research that looks at the timing issue under alternative formulations of the
competitive and stochastic structure, and in settings where information acquisition and disclosure
may take place at different points in time, will shed more light on this issue.
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Table 1NUMERICAL ANALYSIS
Payoff  Matrix  (T= 11, v1=v2=1)
Rows (Columns) represent period duopolist 1 (2) acquires information
r = .3
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1 4.64 4.64 4.53 7.4 4.54 9.56 4.54 11.1 4.53 12 4.49 12.2 4.41 11.8 4.31 10.8 4.16 9.09 3.99 6.8 3.78 3.8
2 7.4 4.53 8.44 8.44 8.17 10.5 8.02 11.9 7.89 12.7 7.76 12.8 7.61 12.4 7.43 11.2 7.23 9.48 6.99 7.1 6.72 4
3 9.56 4.54 10.47 8.17 11.4 11.4 11 12.7 10.72 13.4 10.47 13.5 10.22 12.9 9.96 11.7 9.67 9.84 9.37 7.4 9.03 4.2
4 11.08 4.54 11.89 8.02 12.7 11 13.51 13.5 13.01 14.1 12.61 14.1 12.24 13.4 11.87 12.1 11.5 10.2 11.12 7.6 10.71 4.4
5 11.97 4.53 12.68 7.89 13.39 10.7 14.09 13 14.78 14.8 14.18 14.6 13.67 13.9 13.19 12.5 12.71 10.5 12.24 7.8 11.75 4.6
6 12.21 4.49 12.84 7.76 13.45 10.5 14.05 12.6 14.63 14.2 15.2 15.2 14.51 14.3 13.89 12.9 13.31 10.8 12.73 8 12.15 4.7
7 11.81 4.41 12.36 7.61 12.89 10.2 13.39 12.2 13.87 13.7 14.34 14.5 14.78 14.8 14 13.2 13.29 11 12.6 8.2 11.92 4.7
8 10.77 4.31 11.24 7.43 11.68 9.96 12.1 11.9 12.49 13.2 12.86 13.9 13.2 14 13.51 13.5 12.65 11.2 11.84 8.3 11.05 4.8
9 9.09 4.16 9.48 7.23 9.84 9.67 10.18 11.5 10.48 12.7 10.75 13.3 11 13.3 11.21 12.7 11.4 11.4 10.45 8.4 9.55 4.8
10 6.77 3.99 7.08 6.99 7.36 9.37 7.61 11.1 7.83 12.2 8.02 12.7 8.17 12.6 8.29 11.8 8.38 10.5 8.44 8.4 7.42 4.7
11 3.8 3.78 4.04 6.72 4.24 9.03 4.41 10.7 4.55 11.8 4.65 12.2 4.71 11.9 4.75 11.1 4.75 9.55 4.71 7.4 4.64 4.6
r = .9
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1 1.71 1.71 1.83 2.83 2.39 3.82 2.84 4.56 3.16 5.02 3.34 5.22 3.39 5.15 3.29 4.82 3.05 4.21 2.67 3.34 2.14 2.19
2 2.83 1.83 3.11 3.11 2.82 3.93 3.24 4.69 3.63 5.22 3.9 5.47 4.04 5.47 4.05 5.2 3.92 4.65 3.65 3.85 3.24 2.77
3 3.82 2.39 3.93 2.82 4.2 4.2 3.66 4.76 3.95 5.3 4.26 5.6 4.47 5.65 4.57 5.44 4.54 4.96 4.37 4.21 4.07 3.2
4 4.56 2.84 4.69 3.24 4.76 3.66 4.98 4.98 4.3 5.31 4.47 5.62 4.7 5.71 4.86 5.55 4.91 5.13 4.84 4.44 4.64 3.49
5 5.02 3.16 5.22 3.63 5.3 3.95 5.31 4.3 5.44 5.44 4.71 5.57 4.79 5.65 4.94 5.53 5.05 5.16 5.05 4.53 4.94 3.64
6 5.22 3.34 5.47 3.9 5.6 4.26 5.62 4.47 5.57 4.71 5.6 5.6 4.87 5.53 4.87 5.4 4.97 5.07 5.02 4.49 4.99 3.66
7 5.15 3.39 5.47 4.04 5.65 4.47 5.71 4.7 5.65 4.79 5.53 4.87 5.44 5.44 4.76 5.19 4.71 4.85 4.76 4.31 4.78 3.53
8 4.82 3.29 5.2 4.05 5.44 4.57 5.55 4.86 5.53 4.94 5.4 4.87 5.19 4.76 4.98 4.98 4.37 4.54 4.3 4.01 4.32 3.26
9 4.21 3.05 4.65 3.92 4.96 4.54 5.13 4.91 5.16 5.05 5.07 4.97 4.85 4.71 4.54 4.37 4.2 4.2 3.7 3.6 3.63 2.87
10 3.34 2.67 3.85 3.65 4.21 4.37 4.44 4.84 4.53 5.05 4.49 5.02 4.31 4.76 4.01 4.3 3.6 3.7 3.11 3.11 2.74 2.34
11 2.19 2.14 2.77 3.24 3.2 4.07 3.49 4.64 3.64 4.94 3.66 4.99 3.53 4.78 3.26 4.32 2.87 3.63 2.34 2.74 1.71 1.71
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Appendix A1
Proof of Proposition 1:  Solution to the Monopolist’s Problem
From equation (6) we have the monopolist’s expected profit (at time to) equ l to
P* = + - + + --
-
=
åTA4  (t  t )
t v
4
  (T 1  t )
t v
4
2
i i 1
i 1
2
i
n
n
n
2
2
Taking derivatives with respect to ti yields
dP
dti
*
= + --
t v
4
t v
4
2tv
4
i 1
2
i+1
2
i
2
   for i = 2....n-1
For i=1
dP*
dt1
=
t 2v
2
4
-
2t1v
2
4
For i=n
dP
dtn
*
= + --
t v
4
(T+1)v
4
2t v
4
n 1
2 2
n
2
Setting the derivatives equal to 0 and solving yields
t
t
1
2
2
=
t
t t
i
i i=
+- +1 1
2
t
T t
n
n=
+ + +( )1
2
1
Information is acquired at equal intervals over the T periods.
Appendix A2
Expected Profit Functions for the Duopolists:
· At t1, the “first” duopolist acquires and discloses information Cf(t1):
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Based on that information, the expected cost of the second duopolist is equal to
E(Cs(t1) |  Cf (t1)) = c + bfCf (t1) ,
with c is the deterministic component of costs, set equal to 0, and bf = rvs/vf ,.
Therefore,
q f (t1 ) =
A - 2Cf (t1) + E(Cs (t1) |  Cf (t1 ))
3
=
A
3
+
(bf - 2)Cf (t1)
3
and Expected Profits are
Pf
* (t1) =
A2
9
+
(bf - 2)
2 t1v f
2
9
where A
2
9
 is the expected profits in the absence of any information.
Similarly, for the “second” duopolist
q s (t1) =
A - 2E(Cs (t1) |  Cf (t1) ) + Cf (t1)
3
=
A
3
+
(1 - 2b f )C f(t1)
3
Ps
* (t2) =
A2
9
+ (1 - 2b f )
2 t1vf
2
9
· At t2, “second” duopolist acquires and discloses information C2(t2)
E(Cf(t2)) is conditional on both Cf(t1) and Cs(t2). The variance-covariance matrix å for the
variables Cf(t2), Cs(t2), Cf(t1), in that order, is
å =
t2vf
2 t2rv f vs t1v f
2
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Therefore,
 E(C f (t2 ) |  Cf(t1),  Cs(t2 ) ) = [ t2rvfvs     t1vf
2 ]  x  å-23
1  x [Cs(t2)  Cf(t1)]T
where å23 is the matrix comprised of the  second and third rows/columns of S. i.e.,
å23 =    
t2vs
2 t1rv f vs
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2
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It follows that
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E(C f (t2 ) |  Cf(t1),  Cs(t2 ) ) = GC f (t1) +  HbsCs (t2 )
where G = t 2(1 - r
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Therefore:
q f (t2 ) =
A - 2E(Cf (t2 ) |  C f(t1),  Cs(t2 )) + Cs(t2 )
3
=
A
3
+
Cs(t2 )(1- 2Hb s ) - 2GC f (t1)
3
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A2
9
+ (1 - 2Hb s )
2
t 2vs
2
9
+ 4G
2t1v f
2
9
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9
and
q s (t2 ) =
A - 2Cs (t2 )) + E(C f (t2) |  Cf (t1),  Cs(t2 ))
3
=
A
3
+
Cs(t2 ) Hbs - 2( )+ GC f (t1)
3
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+
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Now for any duopolist, (i = f or s), A
2
9
 is earned for (t1-1) periods, Pi(t1) is earned for (t2-t1)
periods and  Pi(t2) is earned for (T+1-t2) periods. Therefore, overall profit to be maximized is
Pi* = 
A2
9
(t1-1)+ Pi*(t1)(t2-t1) + Pi*(t2)(T+1-t2)
which yields:
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Appendix A3
Proof of Proposition 2:
When r = 0, bf = bs = 0 and G = 1.  Therefore, from (7.1) and (7.2),
Pf* = T
A2
9
 + [ 
4t1v f
2
9
](t2-t1) + [
t 2vs
2
9
+
4t1vf
2
9
](T+1-t2)
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Maximizing Pf* with respect to t1 and  Ps* with respect to t2 yields
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Setting the derivatives equal to zero and solving for t1 and t2 yields the results.
Proof of Proposition 3:
When r=1, G=0 and H=1.  Therefore, from (7.1) and (7.2),
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Maximizing Pf* with respect to t1 and setting it equal to 0, we get
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Similarly, Maximizing Ps* with respect to t2 and setting it equal to 0, we get
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Using the expression for t1 above gives the result
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